COMMENT
A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COURT
APPOINTED COUNSEL FOR THE INVOLUNTARILY
COMMITTED MENTALLY ILL: BEYOND THE
CIVIL-CRIMINAL DISTINCTION
INTRODUCTION

Involuntary civil commitment of the mentally ill entails a loss of
liberty substantially paralleling incarceration for criminal activity.'
The protection of individuals accused of crime is facilitated through
the provision of a full range of constitutional safeguards which enable
the accused to adequately defend against the state's power. 2 The Supreme Court has recognized that civil commitment results in a substantial loss of liberty.3 However, since this form of incarceration is generally considered to have been provided for the individual's care and
protection, 4 it has usually been effectuated without those procedural
1 See, e.g., Barry v. Hall, 98 F.2d 222, 225 (D.C. Cir. 1938), wherein the court stated:
"[C]onfinement in a mental hospital is as full and effective a deprivation of personal
liberty as is confinment in jail."
2 See, e.g., the application of fourth, fifth and sixth amendment guarantees in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (right to appointed counsel in all criminal prosecutions where there may be a deprivation of liberty); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968) (jury trial); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (speedy trial); Griffin
v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (protection against commentary by the prosecution concerning the failure of accused to testify); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (privilege
against self-incrimination); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to appointed
counsel in all felony prosecutions); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (exclusion of
evidence obtained by unreasonable search and seizure).
8 E.g., Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972).
4 Gupta, in an expansive article on mental health, states:
Legislatures pretending to be humane tend to rely on the state's obligation as
parens patriae, and consider suspending due process guarantees in involuntary
commitment laws an act of generosity toward the mentally ill. Consequently,
notice, hearing, right to counsel, and jury trial have been variously provided
for or not according to the source of statutory authority emphasized.
Gupta, New York's Mental Health Information Service: An Experiment in Due Process,
25 RuTrEas L. REv. 405, 406-07 (1971).
The state usually presents two rationales for the withholding of more rigorous
procedural safeguards: (a) the prerogative of the state as custodian or guardian of the
mentally ill pursuant to its parens patriae role, and (b) the state providing treatment
rather than punishment for the mentally ill. Combs, Burden of Proof and Vagueness in
Civil Commitment Proceedings, 2 AM. J. CIUm. L. 47, 50-51 (1973). See also Note, Civil
Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Theories and Procedures, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1288, 1290,
1295-97 (1966).
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safeguards mandatory in a criminal prosecution. 5 The failure to provide procedural due process protection at involuntary civil commitment is essentially the product of a prevailing judicial reasoning that
commitment proceedings are civil in nature.0 However, there is an
increasing recognition that when a substantial loss of liberty is threatened, the fact that the proceedings are denominated "civil" will not be
permitted to determine the measure of due process afforded the individual.7 The dispositive issue should not be the nature of the proceeding, but rather the divestment of one's liberty.
Wexler, Therapeutic Justice, 57 MINN. L. REv. 289, 304 (1972). The author stated:
American law thus has two parallel but very different procedural systems for
controlling aberrant behavior-a criminal system with a host of procedural
rights and a therapeutic system with very few.
The most significant reason for the lack of procedural safeguards lies in the existence
of a contrary trend, noted as still continuing over a decade ago, toward the use of quasijudicial and administrative commitment procedures. Under the guise of moving away
from "legal formalism," a concomitant and somewhat deliberate failure to allow strict
due process requirements to materialize developed within the context of this setting.
Kittrie, Compulsory Mental Treatment and the Requirements of "Due Process," 21 OHIo
S.L.J. 28-29 (1960) (citing Kadish, A Case Study in the Signification of Procedural Due
Process-Institutionalizingthe Mentally 11, 9 W. POL. Q. 93, 96-97 (1956)). For an overview of due process requirements for civil commitment at the time, see generally Ross,
Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Problems of Law and Policy, 57 MICH. L. Ruv. 945, 96478 (1959).
The Supreme Court has recently indicated surprise at the lack of litigation concerning the constitutional limitations on state power in several areas, including that of
civil commitment. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 737 (1972).
6 Bruce Ennis, the former director of the Civil Liberties and Mental Illness Project
of the New York Civil Liberties Union, attributed the presence of summary commitment
procedures and the absence of due process standards to the following theories: (a) the
proceedings are civil; (b) the purpose of commitment is not punishment; (c) formal proceedings would be traumatic to the prospective patient; and (d) a formal hearing would
"stigmatize" the prospective patient. Ennis, Civil Liberties and Mental Illness, 7 CraM.
L. BULL. 101, 109 (1971).
7 The foundation for the right of the alleged mentally ill to due process of law in
civil commitment proceedings was established in Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate
Court, 309 U.S. 270 (1940). This case was an appeal from a denial of a writ of prohibition
commanding the probate court to desist from attempting to commit the appellant as a
"psychopathic personality." Appellant attacked the Minnesota commitment statute as
violative of the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment.
Although the Court rejected the appellant's principal contentions, it did recognize a
right to due process:
We fully recognize the danger of a deprivation of due process in proceedings dealing with persons charged with insanity . . . and the special importance
of maintaining the basic interests of liberty ... and courts may be imposed upon
if the substantial rights of the persons charged are not adequately safeguarded
at every stage of the proceedings.
Id. at 276-77. Focusing upon the question of whether the statutory procedures adequately
safeguarded the fundamental rights embraced by due process, the Court found the
statutes not patently offensive in any respect, and further assumed that the Minnesota
court would protect all of the constitutional rights which appellant possessed. In analyzing
5
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This comment will focus upon the developing recognition of the
constitutional right of indigent mental patients," to be represented by
court appointed counsel when faced with the possibility of involuntary
civil commitment. 9 Special emphasis will be directed toward an analysis
of the prevailing view that commitment proceedings are nonadversarial
in nature in light of the demise of the civil-criminal dichotomy as a
standard for measuring the requirements of due process.
THE

RATIONALE FOR COMMITMENT

The critical policy issue underlying the civil commitment question
is whether the state is acting predominantly for the benefit of the individual or for the protection of society in general. Justice Brandeis has

taken a critical view of procedural laxity whenever it has been tolerated
in the name of governmental beneficence. In a dissenting opinion to
the 1928 wiretapping case, Olmstead v. United States,'0 Brandeis
argued:
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect
the procedure used to commit, the Court alluded to the fact that legal representation
had been furnished. Id. at 273-75.
8 See Schneider, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 58 A.B.A.J. 1059, 1061 (1972).
Judge Schneider of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, notes that in his court
the majority of commitment hearings are instituted against the poor, and rarely is the
same judicial machinery used to impose treatment on the upper or middle classes. The
judge cites the fact that the wealthy can afford the alternatives to institutionalization as
the primary cause of this disparity. Id. See also A. HOLLINGSHEAD & F. REDLICH, SOCIAL
CLASS AND MENTAL ILLNESS: A COMMUNITY STUDY 253-334 (1958).
9 Although involuntary commitment has been variously defined by the authorities,
the term commonly includes all situations in which the committed or an authorized agent
had not instituted the commitment process. On that basis estimates indicate that between
80 and 90 percent of all admissions are involuntary. Postel, Civil Commitment: A Functional Analysis, 38 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1, 4 & n.15 (1971) (citing Hearings on S. 935 Before
the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 61 (1963), and Hearings on Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Ill Before the
Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 1, at 11 (1961)).
By way of contrast, Dr. Albert Deutsch has estimated that approximately 90 percent
of all commitments are voluntary. Postel, supra at 4 n.16 (citing Hearings on Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Ill Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the
Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1963)). Postel observed that Dr.
Deutsch's estimate is based on a definition of voluntary commitment as those cases in
which the patient neither objected nor took a position on the matter. Postel, supra at 4
n.16.
The procedures for commitment of the mentally ill vary from state to state. However, there are basically three types of commitment that are almost universally employed.
These include: (1) emergency commitment or detention; (2) involuntary commitment
for an indeterminate period; and (3) voluntary commitment. See, e.g., B. ENNIS & L. SIEGEL,
THE RIGHTS OF MENTAL PATIENTS 17-39 (1973).
10 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
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liberty when the Government's purposes are beneficent ....
The
greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men
of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding."
This admonition has particular applicability in civil commitment
cases, where it has been frequently cited by advocates of more stringent
procedural safeguards for the alleged mentally ill.12 The warning is

also of significance because of widespread misconceptions concerning
the state's role in the commitment process. An analysis of the state's

power to commit will aid in delineating its role and motivation in the
commitment process.
Parens Patriae
A major justification for the state's power to commit is based upon
the doctrine of parens patriae.13 At common law, parens patriae was
defined as the duty of the king to care for these subjects who were unable to care for themselves. 1 4 The states have now assumed this duty
11 Id. at 479 (footnote omitted).
12 Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1103 (E.D. Wis. 1972). See Cohen, The
Function of the Attorney and the Commitment of the Mentally 111, 44 TEXAS L. REV.
424, 433 n.43 (1966); Dershowitz, Law of Dangerousness: Some Fictions about Predictions,
23 J. LEGAL ED. 24, 47 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Dershowitz, Law of Dangerousness];
Dershowitz, The Psychiatrist'sPower in Civil Commitment: A Knife That Cuts Both Ways,
PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Feb. 1969, at 47 [hereinafter cited as Dershowitz, A Knife That Cuts
Both Ways]; Ennis, supra note 6, at 102-03; Gupta, supra note 4, at 442; Postel, supra
note 9, at 6.
13 Taylor, A Critical Look Into the Involuntary Civil Commitment Procedure, 10
WASHBuRN L.J. 237, 239 (1971). The interposition of the state is founded upon the
inability of the patient to independently arrive at a sound decision. Id. at 240. The
Supreme Court has recognized the potential threat to constitutional rights posed by an
overly broad interpretation of parens patriae in the field of juvenile justice:
The Latin phrase proved to be a great help to those who sought to rationalize
the exclusion of juveniles from the constitutional scheme; but its meaning is
murky and its historic credentials are of dubious relevance.
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967).
14 Beverly's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 1118 (K.B. 1603). This case gives a detailed description of the development of common law and early statutory provisions relating to the
guardianship of idiots and lunatics (non compos mentis or not master of his mind) and
the protection of their property. Lunatics were characterized as those in possession of
unsound memory which might be recovered at any time. As a consequence, the duty
of the King to the idiot was custodial in nature (Rex habebit custodiam), whereas his
duty to the lunatic was to care for both his person and property (Rex providebit or
the King will see ahead, i.e., will take care). Id. at 1126.
A much broader definition of lunacy is described by Blackstone. 1 W. BLACESTONE
COMMENTARIES0 304
A lunatic, or noncompos mentis, is one who hath had understanding, but
by disease, grief, or other accident, hath lost the use of his reason.
Blackstone described the King's relation to lunatics as a "guardian" but emphasized,
as in Beverly's Case, the potential temporary nature of their infirmity, and that they may
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through the enactment of statutes designed to provide care and treatment for the mentally ill.'1
Parens patriae has a substantial effect on the lives of persons subject to commitment proceedings. First, the doctrine permits the commitment of persons on the basis of their need for treatment's regardrecover their proprietary rights "when they come to their right mind." Id.
15 See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 45, § 210 (1958), wherein a person may be committed
if he is
so defective mentally that he (or she) ought to be committed to the hospital
for insane persons for safekeeping and treatment.
HAWAII REv. STAT. § 334-53(a) (1968) authorizes the administrator of a psychiatric
facility or his deputy to
admit to and detain at the facility for observation, care, and treatment as a
patient any person mentally ill or habituated to the excessive use of drugs or
alcohol to an extent requiring hospitalization ....
N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAw § 31.01 (McKinney Supp. 1972-73), which defines a person
"in need of involuntary care and treatment" as one who
has a mental illness for which care and treatment as a patient in a hospital is
essential to such person's welfare and whose judgment is so impaired that he is
unable to understand the need for such care and treatment.
Although it is formally absent from the New York hospitalization statute, the element
of dangerousness to oneself or others represents a critical issue in commitment hearings.
Kumasaka & Gupta, Lawyers and Psychiatrists in the Court: Issues on Civil Commitment,
32 MD. L. REv. 6, 10, 12 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Lawyers and Psychiatrists in the
Court]. Consequently, a patient adjudged "harmless" may be released to the custody of
relatives. Id. at 10 n.ll.
16 There has been a growing recognition that when the state confines a person for
treatment, the confinement is merely custodial. Clinical data compiled by three clinical
psychologists demonstrates the conflict between the "idea" of treatment and the reality
of what they termed a "custodial system" marked by "dehumanization and institutionalization." Suchotliff, Steinfeld & Tolchin, The Struggle for Patients' Rights in a State Hospital, 54 MENTAL HYGIENE 230, 230-31 (1970). The study is a compilation of their experiences in trying to implement change at the Fairfield Hills Hospital (Newton, Conn.)
of which they were staff members. They found that the basic individual rights of the
patients were continually violated; the patients were allowed no communication with
attorneys or relatives by phone or by mail, and no periodic review of patient's present
condition or treatment needs. They also discovered that voluntarily committed patients
were not permitted to leave and those who did were forcefully "captured" and returned.
Id. at 231.
The situation may be far worse than we realize.
Empirical evidence has shown how the social processes and structures of a
typical "chronic" ward not only fail to be therapeutic, but are actually antitherapeutic, in spite of an espoused therapeutic ideology more or less accepted
by front-line staff. These processes and structures not only fail to undo the
early damage, but instead act to reinforce schizophrenic adaptation. In this sense
the charge that mental hospitals make people sick is not absurd.
Kantor & Gelineau, Making Chronic Schizophrenics, 53 MENTAL HYGIENE 54, 65 (1969)
(emphasis in original) (both of the authors were clinical psychologists on the staff of
Boston State Hospital, Boston, Mass.).
This concept is of major significance since the failure of the state to provide more
than custodial care obviates the original therapeutic justification for committing the
patient. Because commitment of the noncriminal mental patient is primarily justified by
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less of their capacity to evaluate that need.' 7 Secondly, it may be
impossible for an individual who does not desire treatment to effectively
contest commitment because the parens patriae role of the state is executed in a nonadversary proceeding."" Ordinarily, the state provides for
the doctrine of parens patriae, the continuation of that commitment represents the
exercise of bare police power without legal justification whenever the state fails to
provide adequate treatment.
Alternatively, the state may commit an individual under the theory of its police
power only where that person poses a threat to society. If such is the case, and the
state fails to provide treatment to remove the threat, it is in fact punishing that individual.
See, e.g., In re Curry, 452 F.2d 1360, 1363 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (custodial care alone gives
rise to release unless diagnosis, observation, and ultimately treatment is provided). This
form of "treatment" is justified only in response to action that violates the law.
See Penn, Sindberg & Roberts, The Dilemma of Involuntary Commitment: Suggestions
for a Measurable Alternative, 53 MENTAL HYGIENE 4, 5 (1969):
Although we certainly would not advocate preventing anyone from receiving
needed treatment, we very seriously question whether the great majority of
those who are involuntarily committed really need the "treatment" they receive.
(emphasis in original).
17 Unfortunately, the parens patriae concept assumes that all persons who suffer
from mental disturbance are equally incapable of making rational choices as to their
need for treatment. See Combs, supra note 4, at 50. Since the patient is presumed to be
incapable of making rational choices as to his treatment needs, the doctrine eliminates
the necessity to obtain permission for any treatment procedure believed necessary for
the patient's welfare. Therefore the patient cannot, in effect, refuse treatment. T. SZAsz,
LAW, LIBERTY, AND PSYCHIATRY 151-52 (1963). See, e.g., O'Donoghue v. Riggs, 73 Wash. 2d
814, 820 n.2, 440 P.2d 823, 828 n.2 (1968) (relying on a state statute which makes such
conduct lawful, the court observed that a patient impliedly consents to use of such force
as may be reasonably necessary for proper care).
Additionally, it has been stressed that a distinction must be made between "rational"
choices, "irrational" choices and simply "wrong" choices. Too often, a patient's refusal of
treatment or denial of illness is interpreted as an inability to recognize his own illness
and his need for treatment. See Ennis, supra note 6, at 103-05. Such a self-serving rationale
is manifested, nevertheless, in the definitions section of various state statutes. A person
"in need of involuntary care and treatment" under the New York hospitalization statute
is one "whose judgment is so impaired that he is unable to understand the need for

such care and treatment." N.Y.

MENTAL HYGIENE LAw §

31.01 (McKinney Supp. 1972-73).

Is In re Phillips, 158 Mich. 155, 122 N.W. 554 (1909) (proceeding to declare a person
insane is not adversary but in the public's interest); Prokosch v. Brust, 128 Minn. 324,
151 N.W. 130 (1915) (proceeding to appoint a guardian is not adversary when initiated
by the state pursuant to its parens patriae status); Hook v. Simes, 98 N.H. 280, 98 A.2d
165 (1953) (the determination of insanity and the appointment of a guardian constitute
matters germane to a parens patriae proceeding and are therefore not adversary).
Professor Harris notes that members of the medical profession believe that adversary
proceedings will result in irreparable damage to the patient. He observes, however, that
the hospital administration is an interested party in such proceedings and, as it often
favors the patient's commitment, it must necessarily be adverse to a patient who desires
release. Harris, Mental Illness, Due Process and Lawyers, 55 A.B.A.J. 65, 66 (1969).
Nevertheless, a recent position statement of the American Psychiatric Association
with regard to involuntary commitment has been interpreted as an encouraging development because of its recognition of the need for due process guarantees. Wexler, supra
note 5, at 317. Pursuant to the Association's adopted policy, all patients would be
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adversary proceedings when the parties to the action have conflicting
interests. In a commitment proceeding, however, it is maintained that
all parties to the action have a common purpose because its objective
is therapeutic. The weakness of this argument becomes apparent when
an individual has decided that he does not wish to be subjected to
treatment. In such a situation the commitant would then be placing
himself in an adversary position, in which his will would challenge
the interest of the state.19
In response, the state often extends the "common interest" view
in such circumstances by interpreting any objection to treatment as
a failure to recognize illness or, more seriously, as a symptom of the
disease. 20 Militating against this position is a growing view that a commitant should have the right to refuse treatment because of the possibility of a substantial loss of liberty.21 There is also increasing recognientitled to a psychiatric examination by both the hospitalizing physician and by one or
more independent psychiatrists if so requested. The results of these tests would then be
made available to the court which determines the need for treatment. All patients would
have the benefit of legal representation at both the initial proceeding and, if committed,
at reasonable subsequent intervals where the need of continued hospitalization would be
judicially decided. All parties concerned with the commitment proceedings must receive
frequent periodic reports of the patient's treatment and progress which cannot be denied
by "administrative, judicial, or institutional delay." American Psychiatric Association,
Position Statement on Involuntary Hospitalization of the Mentally I1, 128 AM. J. PsYcH.
1480 (1972).
However, there are jurists who believe that the right to counsel guarantee may be
potentially damaging to a patient where an attorney refuses to permit his own independent evaluation of his dient's best interests to govern his professional conduct. In
such instances, it is maintained, an informal hearing is transformed into an adversary
trial which may leave traumatic repercussions upon the patient-client. Dix, Hospitalization
of the Mentally Ill in Wisconsin: A Need for Reevaluation, 51 MARQ. L. REv. 1, 33 (1967).
In contrast to this approach, other jurists oppose assignment of counsel and adversary trials, at least in habeas corpus proceedings, because of the additional burden
that would be placed upon lawyers and physicians to execute their responsibilities and
to justify their judgments respectively. The threat of adversary trials is not seen by these
members of the legal community as an impetus for better diagnoses or superior hospital
management. People ex rel. Rogers v. Stanley, 17 N.Y.2d 256, 260-61, 217 N.E.2d 636,
637, 270 N.Y.S.2d 573, 574-75 (1966) (Bergan, J., dissenting).
19 The author defines a commitant as a person who is subjected to the commitment
process as well as one who is in fact committed.
20 Wexler, supra note 5, at 325.
21 It has often been asserted that an underlying issue is whether the individual has
the right to refuse treatment. Postel, supra note 9, at 2.
Even a person who comprehends the fact that he needs treatment may come to a
rational conclusion that the following negative effects of commitment outweigh the
benefits of treatment: loss of liberty; stigma of being an ex-mental patient; difficulty of
obtaining release from institutions; curtailment of rights; effect on acquiring employment;
possible deprivation of driver license privileges after release; and, general disruption to
former life situation. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1094 (E.D. Wis. 1972). In
addition to citing reasons why a person would desire to refuse treatment, the court noted
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tion of the argument that the need for treatment, standing alone,
represents an insufficient justification for the state to deprive persons
22
of their liberty.
Police Power
An alternative approach adopted by many jurisdictions is based
upon the theory that the state, through its police power, has the authority to commit those persons who are dangerous to themselves or to
society. 23 On cursory examination, application of police power standards to commitment would seem more palpable and, in fact, overcome
many of the incongruities of the parens patriae commitment standards. 24 However, the police power justification for state action in
that since persons who need hospitalization for physical ailments are allowed to choose,
a person with a mental illness should be allowed to choose unless the state can demonstrate that the person is unable to make that decision because of the nature of his illness.
Id.
22 See Ennis, supra note 6, at 103: "Furthermore, even if a thousand psychiatrists
agreed that a given person was mentally ill (and non-dangerous) that alone would not
justify commitment." See also Turkel & Szasz, "What Psychiatry Can Do": A Comment
and a Reply, HARPER'S, Apr. 1964, at 96, where Szasz, in his reply, stated:
I oppose involuntary mental hospitalization . . . because, in a free society, I do
not believe that mental illness is a morally legitimate ground for loss of liberty.
Only conviction for lawbreaking is.
Id. at 100. The New York Civil Liberties Union also takes the position that all involuntary
commitments should be abolished:
Mental illness can never by itself be a justifiable reason for depriving a person
of liberty or property, against his objection. Even when such deprivations are
accompanied by fair procedures, they are unjustified except on a basis-for
example, a violation of the criminal law-that would be equally applicable in
the absence of mental illness.
Ennis, supra note 6, at 102 n. 2 (quoting from N.Y.C.L.U. Board of Directors on Jan. 15,
1969).
Those who do not oppose all forms of involuntary civil commitment maintain that
a threat to society is necessary to commit a person who refuses treatment. One legal
commentator feels that this requirement represents the only legitimate reason for commitment. Taylor, supra note 13, at 242.
23 Dix, supra note 18, at 27; Comment, Compulsory Commitment: The Rights of
the Incarcerated Mentally Ill,1969 DUKE L.J. 677, 683-84. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406
U.S. 715, 737 n.19 (1972), where the Court noted the jurisdictions which provide for some
judicially supervised form of involuntary commitment: (a) six states commit pursuant
to the patient's need for treatment; (b) in nine jurisdictions dangerousness to self or
others is the sole criterion for commitment; (c) 18 other jurisdictions have as their standard, the patient's need for care or treatment on an alternative basis; and (d) some jurisdictions leave the determination to the judge's discretion.
24 The confusion surrounding what constitutes mental illness, coupled with the vague
criterion of "need of care or treatment," creates such a loose standard that parens patriae
can be easily abused. See generally Combs, supra note 4, at 50, 58-59. According to the
author, "need" does not connote an absolute standard, rather, its customary construction
is "desirability," thereby inviting the witness to speculate from his own values. Id. at 58.
Furthermore, while the common statutory alternative of "dangerousness" suggests
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committing persons involuntarily is also subject to criticism since its
standard of "dangerousness" is itself vague and thus subject to inherent
defects. 25 Dangerousness has been defined in a variety of ways by various states in their commitment statutes. For example, in New Jersey
and Montana, a person is dangerous if he is a threat to other individuals, to himself, or to property. 26 In Nevada, Massachusetts, and
Maryland there must be an explicit showing that the individual is
dangerous to other persons. 27 The most common criterion, however,
some objective criteria, "need" invites subjective construction. See Dodd v. Hughes, 81
Nev. 43, 47, 398 P.2d 540, 542 (1965). Ordinarily, the void for vagueness doctrine as
usually employed is not applicable because mental illness is theoretically not a condition
which could be avoided even if the statutory classifications contained sufficient specificity
to enable a person to govern his conduct accordingly. Nevertheless, these statutes may
be open to constitutional attack where they invite "arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement by officials." Combs, supra note 4, at 55 (footnote omitted).
25 An extreme example of the wide latitude which has been employed in the classification of "dangerousness" is found in United States v. Charnizon, 232 A.2d 586 (D.C.
Ct. App. 1967), in which a probable "check bouncer" was found to be dangerous to others.
26 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-23 (Supp. 1973-74) defines mental illness as
mental disease to such an extent that a person so afflicted requires care and
treatment for his own welfare, or the welfare of others, or of the community.
New Jersey's commitment statutes have been interpreted to include "dangerous to
property." In re Heukelekian, 24 N.J. Super. 407, 409, 94 A.2d 501, 502 (App. Div. 1953).
MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 38-208 (1947) states in pertinent part:
The judge .. .if he believes the person so far disordered in his mind as to
endanger health, person, or property, must make an order that the party be confined in the Montana state hospital ....
27 MD.ANN. CODE art. 59, § 12 (1972) authorizes the admission for purposes of care
and treatment of any person who:
(1)Has a mental disorder; and
(2) For the protection of himself or others, needs inpatient medical care or
treatment ....
MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 123, § 8 (1972) states that if a hearing is requested prior to commitment, the court shall not order the person committed or renew an order for the
commitment unless it finds:
(1) such person is mentally ill; and (2) the discharge of such person from a
facility would create a likelihood of serious harm.
MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 123, § 1 defines "likelihood of serious harm" as
(1) substantial risk of physical harm to the person himself as manifested by
evidence of threats of, or attempts at, suicide or serious bodily harm; (2) a substantial risk of physical harm to other persons as manifested by evidence of homicidal or other violent behavior or evidence that others are placed in reasonable
fear of violent behavior and serious physical harm to them; or (3) a very substantial risk of physical impairment or injury to the person himself as manifested
by evidence that such person's judgment is so affected that he is unable to
protect himself in the community and that reasonable provision for his protection is not available in the community.
NEv. REv. STAT. § 433.685 2(a) (1971) authorizes commitment:
2. By a sworn written statement by the petitioner that:
(a) The petitioner has good reason to believe that such person is mentally ill and,
because of such illness, is likely to injure himself or others if allowed to remain
at liberty ....
Nav. REv. STAT. § 433.695 (1971) states:
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is dangerousness to self and others.28
Ordinarily, the police power is exercised in criminal law to punish
those persons who have been found to have violated a societal norm.
However, since civil commitment is not contingent upon the commission of a crime, the finding that a person is a threat to society is essen29
tially based upon a prediction of the individual's future behavior.
The use of the state's police power in this respect may be questioned
for two basic reasons. First, it sanctions massive preventive detention 0
-a means of social control which raises serious moral questions, is
subject to extensive abuse, 81 and is generally in direct contradiction
to the concepts of a free society.3 2 Secondly, the predictive capabilities
33
of the behavioral sciences have been subjected to extensive criticism.

If the district court finds, after a hearing . . . that the person with respect
to whom such hearing was held:
1. Is not mentally ill, or if mentally ill is not likely to injure himself or
others if allowed to remain at liberty, the court shall immediately order his
release.
28 See Ennis, supra note 6, at 107; B. ENNIs & L. SIEGEL, supra note 9, at 93-282 (a
compilation of the standards for commitment by jurisdiction in appendix form).
29 Wexler, supra note 5, at 319.
30 "The most widespread form of preventive detention employed in the United States
today is commitment of the mentally ill." Dershowitz, On "Preventive Detention," THE
NEw YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, Mar. 13, 1969, at 22, 23.
31 The great potential for the misuse of the commitment process has been cited by
some writers as the greatest threat, in what has been labeled the "emerging therapeutic
state." Szasz maintains that an uncontrolled therapeutic state could eliminate from the
political mainstream those individuals deemed "undesirable" through arbitrary psychological characterization and commitment. Hence, Whittaker Chambers has been called a
"psychopathic personality," Barry Goldwater a "paranoid schizophrenic," and Woodrow
Wilson a "neurotic," frequently "very close to psychosis (by no less a psychiatrist than
Sigmund Freud). Dr. Szasz warns "[t]he commitment procedure has already been used
against General Edwin Walker and Ezra Pound." Szasz, The Crime of Commitment,
PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Mar. 1969, at 55, 56.
32 Senator Sam Ervin, Jr., in his opening remarks during the Senate's hearings on
preventive detention of criminal suspects alleged to be dangerous to the community, considered whether the possible threat that suspected criminals impose on society, if they are
allowed to remain free, outweighs the moral disdain of preventive detention:
[I]t is better for our country to take these risks and remain a free society than it
is for it to adopt a tyrannical practice of imprisoning men for crimes which they
have not committed and may never commit ....
Hearings on Preventive Detention Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Ses. 3 (1970). The Senator expressed
both an opinion that the concept of preventive detention is "repugnant to our traditions,"
id. at 3, and his deep unalterable opposition to the procedure:
These measures trouble me greatly for I am convinced that they are unconstitutional and would initiate a dangerous and unfortunate policy in the administration of criminal justice.
Id. at 1.
33 J. ZISKIN, COPING wrrH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY 131-35 (1970);
Dershowitz, A Knife That Cuts Both Ways, supra note 12, at 47; Dershowitz, Law of
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The state's ability to commit an individual as an exercise of its
police power is determinative of the nature of the commitment process
itself.
Although commitments pursuant to the police power may
often involve therapeutic elements, the real basis for intervention
34
under the police power is, of course, the protection of society.
Because the primary thrust of the police power rationale is the protection of society, the state should not be permitted to argue that it
is acting solely on behalf of the patient. When the state acts pursuant
to its police power, the proceedings take on an adversary nature. What
clearly emerges is a conflict of interest in which the state, while ostensibly attempting to protect the commitant, in reality, Seeks to protect
itself. The justification for withholding more rigorous procedural
safeguards at commitment hearings has been the state's professed unselfish and beneficent intent towards the individual. However, it would
appear that when the state acts pursuant to its police power, it should
be required to provide the individual with due process safeguards. 35
At a minimum, an attorney should be provided the commitant because of the adversarial nature of the proceeding. In order to appreciate
Dangerousness, supra note 12, at 46-47; Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl, On the Justifications for Civil Commitment, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 75, 82-85 (1968).
For an analysis of case studies concerning the relationship between dangerous criminal
activity and the mentally ill, see Greenland, Evaluation of Violence and Dangerous Behavior Associated With Mental Illness, 3 SEMINARS IN PSYCHiArRY 345, 353-54 (1971); see also
Schreiber, Indeterminate Therapeutic Incarceration of Dangerous Criminals: Perspectives
and Problems, 56 U. VA. L. REV. 602, 619 (1970).
84 Wexler, supra note 5, at 323.
35 Justice Black, dissenting in Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 389 (1971), discussed the difference between civil and criminal actions. In defining the nature of a civil
action, he emphasized the state's role in each type of proceeding when he stated:
Civil lawsuits, however, are not like government prosecutions for crime.
Civil courts are set up by government to give people who have quarrels with their
neighbors the chance to use a neutral governmental agency to adjust their differences. In such cases the government is not usually involved as a party, and there is
no deprivation of life, liberty, or property as punishment for crime. Our Federal
Constitution, therefore, does not place such private disputes on the same high
level as it places criminal trials and punishment. There is consequently no necessity,
no reason, why government should in civil trials be hampered or handicapped by
the strict and rigid due process rules the Constitution has provided to protect
people charged with crime.
Id. at 391.
If the standard for a civil action is the use of the courts as a "neutral governmental
agency" to adjust personal quarrels with their neighbors, it becomes immediately apparent that commitment is not an ordinary civil action. Furthermore, in the case of commitment, there is a deprivation of life, liberty, and property. It would seem that an
adversary proceeding is dearly required in cases where the state deprives a person of his
fundamental rights.
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the fundamental importance of having counsel in a commitment proceeding, it is necessary to examine the historical development of the
right to court appointed counsel in criminal cases, as well as the due
process safeguards afforded in the civil context.
THE RIGHT

To

COUNSEL

& DUE PROCESS

In state criminal prosecutions, the fourteenth amendment's due
process clause has been employed to extend the concept of court appointed counsel.3 6 While early decisions rejected the contention that
the due process clause incorporated the sixth amendment's guarantee
of a right to counsel, it was recognized that fundamental fairness dictated the appointment of counsel where circumstances required that
protection.8 7 The Court in Gideon v. Wainwright, s reversed its earlier
views, concluding that the sixth amendment was applicable to the
states through the due process requirement.3 9 The Court emphasized
the necessity of the guidance of counsel at trial because of the proceeding's adversary nature. 40 Recently, the Court extended the constitutional right to counsel to all proceedings irrespective of the alleged
crime's classification as "petty, misdemeanor, or felony." 41 In extending
36 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
37 In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), an issue before the Court was whether
the right to counsel was guaranteed in state trials through the application of the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. However, the decision merely discussed the
relation of that right to due process. The Court cited Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312
(1926), for the proposition that such a right could not be ignored if it violated "'fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political
institutions.'" 287 U.S. at 67 (quoting from 272 U.S. at 316). It chose to emphasize the
close relationship between the right to counsel and the opportunity to be heard. 287 U.S.
at 68-69, 72.
The Court very carefully circumscribed its holding by limiting its immediate application to circumstances where "ignorance, feeble mindedness, illiteracy, or the like" prevented the accused from adequately presenting a defense. Id. at 71. In other words, even
in capital cases most of those accused would presumedly still have been considered
capable of presenting their own defenses.
In Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), the Court acknowledged that its prior expressions "lend color to the argument" that counsel should be provided for all accused of
crime. Id. at 462-63 (footnote omitted). See also cases collected id. at 463 n.13.
38 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
39 Id. at 342. The incorporation of the sixth amendment was based on the belief
that it was a fundamental right similar to those guaranteed in the first, fourth, fifth, and
eighth amendments. Id. at 341-42. Compare the concurring opinion of Justice Douglas,
id. at 345-47, who viewed the decision as a full incorporation of the right, with the concurring opinion of Justice Harlan, id. at 352 (quoting from Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319, 325 (1937)), who perceived application of the right as valid against the states because
it was "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."
40 372 U.S. at 344.
41 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972).
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due process safeguards, the Court, although confining its holding to
criminal cases, emphasized the importance of looking to the effect of
42
sentencing-the deprivation of one's liberty.
The Court has required due process in civil as well as criminal
proceedings,4 3 but a party to a civil action is not granted the full
panoply of rights due a criminal defendant. 44 In analyzing the applicability of procedural rights in civil proceedings, a determination
must first be made that there will be a substantial or "grievous loss"'4
of either liberty or property.46 If so, due process attaches. 47 Having
reached this conclusion, the court must then decide the procedures
to be prescribed in a given situation by analyzing both the nature of
the requisite governmental function, and the affected individual interests. 48 This balancing, or weighing approach, attempts to invest
due process with a flexibility in dealing with differing situations.4 9
42 Id. at 39. Liberty, it should be noted, means more than freedom from physical
restraint. The Court has indicated that it must be accorded a very broad meaning where
contained "[i]n a Constitution for a free people." Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,
572 (1972). For cases broadly interpreting the word "liberty," see Boiling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497, 499 (1954); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1925).
43 See, e.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950)
(due process requires prior notice in trust settlement).
44 See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972) (parole revocation not a
part of criminal prosecution and hence all due process rights do not apply).
45 Id. at 481; Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
46 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471 (1972). The Court in Morrissey stated:
The question is not merely the "weight" of the individual's interest, but whether
the nature of the interest is one within the contemplation of the "liberty or
property" language of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 481 (citing Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972)).
47 See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
48 See, e.g., Cafeteria Workers Local 473 v. McElory, 367 U.S. 886 (1961), where the
Court stated:
[C]onsideration of what procedures due process may require under any given set
of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the
government function involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by governmental action.
Id. at 895.
This two-step approach to due process (first determining whether liberty or property
are deprived, and then weighing the interests to decide what procedures apply) has recently been utilized by the Court in resolving cases where individuals have been deprived
of governmental benefits, usually without prior hearings. See Note, ProceduralDue Process
in Government-Subsidized Housing, 86 HARv. L. REv. 880, 889 (1973).
49 In Board of Regents, the Court stated that "a weighing process has long been a
part of any determination of the form of hearing required in particular situations." Board
of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 (1972) (emphasis in original). See also Boddie v.
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In essence, procedural due process embodies what the Supreme
Court deems to be required by fundamental fairness whenever an
individual faces a deprivation of life, liberty, or property. 50 When such
a cognizable interest is under attack, due process has traditionally required, at a minimum, the elementary protection afforded by prior
notice and hearing. 51 The Court has recognized that such hearing and
notice must be meaningful as to both time and manner.52 In Powell v.
Alabama,5 Justice Sutherland commented on the importance of counsel as a requisite to the hearing requirement.
What, then, does a hearing include? Historically and in practice, in our own country at least, it has always included the right
to the aid of counsel when desired and provided by the party
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971). In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972), the
Court, discussing the due process concept, recognized:
Its flexibility is in its scope once it has been determined that some process is due;
it is a recognition that not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call
for the same kind of procedure.
50 The Court has made the following statements concerning those elements and concepts inherent in due process:
Gagnon v. Scar(a) "[F]undamental fairness-the touchstone of due process .....
pelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973).
(b) "The Due Process Clause commands us to apply its great standard to state court
proceedings to assure basic fairness." Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 213-14 (1968) (Fortas,
J., concurring).
(c) "Due process is that which comports with the deepest notions of what is fair and
right and just." Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 16 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Palko v. Con(d) "[I]mmunities ... implicit in the concept of ordered liberty .
necticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1937).
(e) "[The] principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people
as to be ranked as fundamental." Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
(f) "[T]he fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all
our civil and political institutions .... " Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926).
51 See, e.g., Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 781-82 (1973) (probation revocation requires notice and two hearings-one preliminary and one more comprehensive-before
final revocation can be made); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602-03 (1972) (if on
remand, college teacher in non-tenure system could show property interest in expectancy of employment in light of policies and practices of institution, due process would
require a hearing prior to his termination); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 485-88
(1972) (parole revocation requires notice and two hearings--one preliminary and one more
comprehensive-before final revocation can be made); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 8082 (1972) (repossession through statutory replevin requires notice and prior hearing); Bell
v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1971) (suspension of driver's license of uninsured motorist
requires prior hearing on question of liability); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433,
436-37 (1971) (characterization of a person by "posting" is a stigmatization sufficient to
require prior notice and hearing); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264, 266-71 (1970)
(termination of welfare benefits requires a pre-termination hearing).
For examples of cases upholding summary deprivations where the governmental
interest is paramount, see cases collected in Goldberg, id. at 263 n.10.
52 See, e.g., Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
53 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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asserting the right. The right to be heard would be, in many
cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard
by counsel .... If in any case, civil or criminal, a state or federal
court were arbitrarily to refuse to hear a party by counsel, employed by and appearing for him, it reasonably may not be
doubted that such a refusal would be a denial of a hearing, and,
therefore, of due process in the constitutional sense.54

Although Powell involved the right to counsel in a criminal prosecution, it was cited with approval in Goldberg v. Kelly. 55 In Goldberg,
the Court held that welfare recipients were entitled to prior notice and
hearing before termination of their benefits. 56 While the Court recognized that "[t]he opportunity to be heard must be tailored to the
capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heardp 57 it did
not mandate court appointed counsel to represent the welfare recipients at such hearings, although the Court did permit these indigents

to retain counsel at their own expense. 58 Justice Black, however, observed in his dissent that the majority's interpretation of due process
would logically necessitate the provision of court appointed counsel
since welfare recipients could not afford representation, and the "right"
without the reality would be rendered meaningless. 59
Since the Goldberg decision, the Court has extended the right of

prior notice and hearing to a widening number of protectible interests.
The Court must of necessity face the right to counsel issue in a variety
of civil case situations if the due process guarantee is to be truly
meaningful. 60 In the context of the civil commitment proceeding, the
Id. at 68-69.
397 U.S. 254, 270 (1970).
56 Id. at 266-71.
57 Id. at 268-69 (footnote omitted).
58 Id. at 270.
59 Id. at 278-79 (Black, J., dissenting). For subsequent cases that have applied the
Goldberg "right to retain counsel" rationale to other types of civil proceedings, see Miller
v. United States, 455 F.2d 833, 836 (4th Cir. 1971) (claim proceedings to recover portion of
fine owed to supplier of information leading to conviction of illegal discharger under 1899
Refuse Act); Caulder v. Durham Housing Authority, 433 F.2d 998, 1004 (4th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1003 (1971) (lease termination procedures); Sands v. Wainwright,
357 F. Supp. 1062, 1088-89 (M.D. Fla. 1973) (prison disciplinary hearings); Landman v.
Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 654 (E.D. Va. 1971) (prison disciplinary hearings); Wheeler v.
Adams Co., 322 F. Supp. 645, 652 (D. Md. 1971) (state replevin procedures). But see
Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 195, 198 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049, 405 U.S.
978 (1972) (prison disciplinary proceedings).
60 A line of recent Supreme Court decisions suggests a possible constitutional basis
for guaranteeing court appointed counsel in many kinds of civil cases. The right may
emerge as an outgrowth of the developing Court doctrine of employing due process to
grant indigents access to the judicial process in civil proceedings. In Boddie v. Connecticut,
401 U.S. 371 (1971), the Court held that in view of the state's monopolization of the
54
55
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question is whether the opportunity to be heard, in a manner that
comports with the fundamentals of due process, is dependent upon the
presence of counsel.
THE RIGHT To COUNSEL IN CIVIL COMMITMENT PROCEEDINGS

Premising a right to counsel in civil commitment proceedings on
the due process hearing requirement may be supported by policy
and constitutional considerations which are analogous to that right
in the criminal context, and to the emergent right to counsel in civil
matters. Parallel to the stigmatization emanating from a criminal conviction is the socially detrimental, judicially determined status arising
from civil commitment which inevitably characterizes the individual
as being mentally ill or dangerous. 61 Such a consequence of judicial
process must be considered a deprivation of liberty in its broadest
adjudicatory process, it could not, as a matter of due process, deny indigents access to
divorce courts where they were unable to pay filing and other fees. Id. at 380-81. Since
that decision, however, there appears to be a trend limiting its application to cases involving fundamental interests. See Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 659 (1973); United
States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 445 (1973).
The link between access to the courts and provision of counsel was indicated by
Justice Black in an interesting dissenting opinion he appended to a denial of certiorari
in Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw & Co., 402 U.S. 954 (1971). Despite his prior dissent in
Boddie, Justice Black intimated that if the decision was to stand, it could only do so
through a recognition
that the civil courts of the United States and each of the States belong to the
people of this country and that no person can be denied access to those courts,
either for a trial or an appeal, because he cannot pay a fee, finance a bond, risk
a penalty, or afford to hire an attorney.
402 U.S. at 955-56 (emphasis added). He further reasoned that since the Court in Boddie
had effectively erased distinctions between civil and criminal processes with respect to
court access, the right to appointed counsel for indigents in all civil cases would follow as
the only way of insuring that the access was meaningful. Id. at 958-59.
Although this dissent was written prior to the limitations imposed by Kras and
Ortwein, Justice Black's reasoning still appears to be compelling within the context of
Boddie's limited scope. Thus, where fundamental interests such as basic liberty in civil
commitment are involved, the right to a court appointed attorney may well be constitutionally mandated.
61 For Supreme Court cases discussing the application of due process safeguards where
state action stigmatizes individuals, see Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 434,
436-37 (1971) (recognizing that a statute requiring the posting of an individual's name in
liquor stores as one who through "excessive drinking" exposes his family "to want" or
presents a "danger to the peace" of the community, is a stigmatization bringing procedural due process requirements into play); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967) (characterization of juvenile as "delinquent" and subjecting him to incarceration requires the presence of counsel); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 190-91 (1952) (holding that requirement of loyalty oath, which requires denial of membership in subversive organizations as a condition for public employment, but does not distinguish between "knowing"
and "innocent" membership was, among other things, violative of due process, since such
a disqualification would brand the individual with "a badge of infamy").
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sense, since the whole spectrum of an individual's existence is affected. 62
Moreover, civil commitment results in a deprivation of the individual's physical liberty similar to criminal incarceration. Perhaps it
represents an even more compelling loss of freedom because civil commitment is frequently for an indeterminate period.
In addition to the loss of liberty as a consequence of the commitment procedure, the adversary character of the proceedings, with its
attendant labyrinth of legal complexity, requires the guidance of counsel.63 Thus, a corollary right to the hearing requirement in a variety
of civil proceedings is the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses
in situations where factual determinations are to be made.6 4 Such a
right is particularly crucial in a commitment hearing because the state
frequently introduces expert medical testimony concerning the need
to confine the individual. Under these circumstances, the individual
is especially in need of the assistance of counsel to effectively crossexamine and rebut the testimony of such trained professionals. 4 Rarely
could the commitant adequately perform this task pro se.
The commitant's plight is consequently similar to that formerly
faced by juveniles in juvenile court proceedings. This problem is further exacerbated where the appointment of a guardian or counsel in
commitment proceedings is judicially discretionary, or is conditioned
upon a demand by the commitant. Prior to such a hearing, an obvious
problem in these jurisdictions is the lack of effective notice to the
patient of the statutory right to counsel. In In re Gault,"6 however,
the Supreme Court had considered the entire range of due process
guarantees in juvenile court proceedings, including the question of
whether counsel was necessary to effectively insure protection of the
62 In Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1088-89 (E.D. Wis. 1972), the court outlined the detrimental effects of involuntary civil commitment on a person's civil rights and
liberties under Wisconsin's commitment scheme. These included raising a rebuttable presumption of incompetency; placing restrictions on the right to contract, litigate, and obtain professional licenses; and prohibiting the right to vote, drive a car, serve on juries, or
enter into marriage.
63 See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938).
64 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268-69 (1970).
65 Wexler, supra note 5, at 316. The author suggests that in addition to being necessary to "effectively scrutinize medical and behavioral science testimony," an attorney will
be necessary for more "mundane" tasks such as: (1) examining the factual basis for the
commitment; and (2) examining the suitability of possible less restrictive alternatives. Id.
See also Cohen, supra note 12, at 450-57; Note, The Right to Counsel at Civil Competency
Proceedings, 40 TEMPLE L.Q. 381, 387-89 (1967). For an excellent discussion of the special
role of counsel during emergency detention under California's statutory authority, see
Comment, Compulsory Counsel for California's New Mental Health Law, 17 U.C.L.A.L.
REv. 851, 855-64 (1970).
66 387 U.S. 1 (1967).

COMMENT

1973]

juvenile's rights. In this controversy, the Court was confronted with
a statutory procedure which granted Arizona's juvenile courts discretionary authority to appoint counsel at adjudicatory hearings.6 7 The
state court had rejected the plaintiff's contention that counsel was a
requirement of due process, stating that juvenile courts have the "discretion, but not the duty, to allow such representation. 68 Discretion
had been employed in those cases in which the court, for example,
discerned a conflict between the interests of the child and his parents. 69
The Supreme Court noted that the probation officer's dual role as
arresting officer and witness for the state was necessarily adverse to the
interests of the child, and that he could not therefore act as counsel
to the child.7 0 Since a juvenile adjudicated "delinquent" would be subjected to a substantial loss of liberty, the Court recognized the child's
need for counsel to
cope with problems of law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts,
to insist upon regularity of the proceedings, and to ascertain
whether he has a defense and to prepare and submit it.71
Quoting Powell v. Alabama,72 the Court stated that the child depended73
upon counsel's guidance at the adjudicative proceedings against him.
The Court further maintained that the need for counsel was not limited to those cases in which the juvenile had committed an act which
violated the penal laws. It recognized that delinquents were confined
"for anything from waywardness to rape and homicide. ' 74 The incarceration of juveniles for noncriminal conduct is similar to the commitment of the mentally ill under the therapeutic rationale of parens
patriae, since both groups face a deprivation of liberty for a condition
or "status of being," rather than for the violation of the state's criminal standards. 75 For this reason, the Gault requirement of counsel for
67

Id. at 34-35.

68 Id. at 35.
69 Id.

Id. at 35-36.
Id. at 36 (footnote omitted).
72 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
78 387 U.S. at 36.
74 Id. at 27 (footnote omitted).
75 In Gesicki v. Oswald, 336 F. Supp. 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd mem., 406 U.S. 913
(1972), a 19 year old girl challenged her adjudication as a "wayward minor" and her incarceration in an adult penal institution. 336 F. Supp. 371, 375 n.5. She had been charged
pursuant to N.Y. CODE CGlM. PRO. § 913-a (McKinney 1958) which provided:
Any person between the ages of sixteen and twenty-one who either . . .
(5) is wilfully disobedient to the reasonable and lawful commands of parent,
guardian or other custodian and is morally depraved or ...
(6) who without just cause and without the consent of parents, guardians or other
70
71

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW'

[Vol. 5:64

all juveniles faced with possible commitment should also be a constitutional requisite within the context of civil commitment proceedings.
THE CIVIL-CRIMINAL DISTINCTION-A DISINTEGRATING
BARRIER To DUE PROCESS PROTECTION

The major justification for the absence of due process requirements in involuntary commitment cases has been founded upon the
view that such proceedings are civil rather than criminal in nature.
This distinction has been supported by two major propositions: first,
that the state's intentions are purely beneficent and second, that commitment is not equatable with punishment for the commission of an
antisocial act.
In addressing itself to the ramifications of a civil-criminal distinction, the Supreme Court in Gault held that regardless of the label
ascribed to a juvenile proceeding, be it civil or criminal, the possible
loss of liberty necessitates the imposition of due process safeguards. 76
In recognition of that requirement, the Court guaranteed to the juvenile facing possible commitment the right to: (1) notice to parent
and child adequate to afford reasonable opportunity to prepare a
defense, including a statement of the specific charge alleged; (2) counsel, and provision for the appointment of counsel for the indigent
offender; (3) privilege against self-incrimination; and (4) confrontation
and cross-examination of witnesses. 77 The Court recognized that a
juvenile adjudged to be delinquent is "subjected to the loss of his
liberty for years . . . comparable in seriousness to a felony prosecu-

tion." 78 Hence, in rejecting the civil-criminal dichotomy, the Supreme
Court in Gault chose not to adhere to the traditional rationale founded
upon the purpose of such a distinction but elected to emphasize its
effect.
Although the specific origin of the civil-criminal distinction is
uncertain, its foundational principles had enjoyed seemingly unintercustodians, deserts his or her home or place of abode, and is morally depraved or
is in danger of becoming morally depraved
(7) . .. may be deemed a wayward minor.

Gesicki v. Oswald, 336 F. Supp. 365, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (ordering the convening of threejudge district court).
The statute was subsequently held to be impermissibly vague. 336 F. Supp. 371, 374.
See Comment, Juvenile Statutes and Noncriminal Delinquents: Applying the Void-forVagueness Doctrine, 4 SFaON HALL L. REy. 184, 189-91 (1972).
76 387 U.S. at 27-30.
77 Id. at 33-56.
78 Id. at 36.
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rupted prominence for at least 85 years prior to Gault. In one of the
earliest rep6rted cases concerned with this subject in an involuntary
commitment context, the distinction was upheld by the Iowa Supreme
Court in County of Black Hawk v. Springer.79 In this case, it was
argued that the Iowa commitment procedure violated the due process
provisions of the state constitution."0 Although the language of the
constitution required certain due process safeguards in all criminal
prosecutions and in all cases in which an individual was faced with
the deprivation of life or liberty,8 ' the court confined its application
only to "criminal prosecutions or accusations, for offenses against the
criminal law, where it is sought to punish the offender by fine or imprisonment."82 Because punishment was not the goal sought through
these proceedings, the court viewed this action as noncriminal, thereby
divesting the patient of procedural due process protection.
The inquest of lunacy by a board of commissioners, is in no sense
a criminal proceeding. The restraint of an insane person is not designed as punishment for any act done. The insane are, by the law,
taken into the care and custody of the State, for treatment for their
unfortunate infirmity.83
The theory that commitment does not constitute a deprivation of
liberty was discussed again by the same court almost nine years later
in Chavannes v. Priestley.8 4 Ostensibly because of the severe nature of
the plaintiff's condition, he had been adjudged insane after an ex parte
proceeding. 5 The court stated that commitment is "a method by which
the public discharges its duty to a citizen,"8 6 and that the committed
are not "'deprived of liberty,' within the meaning of the constitu79 58 Iowa 417, 10 N.W. 791 (1881).
80 Id. at 418, 10 N.W. at 791.
81 IOWA CONST. art. 1, § 10, reads as follows:

In all criminal prosecutions, and in cases involving the life, or liberty of an
individual the accused shall have a right to a speedy and public trial by an un'partial jury; to be informed of the accusation against him, to have a copy of the
same when demanded; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for his witnesses; and, to have the assistance of counsel.
82 58 Iowa at 418, 10 N.W. at 791. This interpretation appears to have ignored that
part of section 10 which affords due process safeguards in cases involving the loss of life
or liberty of an accused.
83 Id., 10 N.W. at 791-92.
84 80 Iowa 316, 320-21, 45 N.W. 766, 768 (1890).
85 A duty to notify the patient was dependent upon a determination by the board
of commissioners, during its preliminary inquiry, that exposure of the individual to the
proceedings would not have a detrimental effect. However, the court simultaneously observed that the matters adjudicated herein were not conclusive but subject to possible
rectification pursuant to the patient's right of appeal. Id. at 319-21, 45 N.W. at 767-68.
86 Id. at 320, 45 N.W. at 768.
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tion."7 Thus, the court's civil-criminal distinction supported the view
that parens patriaejustifies the commitment process, and that commitment does not involve loss of liberty.
The nature of the commitment process was again considered by
the Iowa Supreme Court in In re Bresee.88 Here the court concluded
that the state's failure to provide for a trial by jury at commitment
hearings did not invalidate such proceedings because they were not
criminal in character, 9 but were of a statutorily defined "special"
nature. 90 Hence, commitment was technically not a civil action within
the contemplation of a state statute which authorized a jury trial in
certain civil proceedings. 91
An alternative approach taken by some jurisdictions is that commitment proceedings are of a special quasi-criminal nature since they
fail to fall within the technical parameters of either civil or criminal
actions. 92 The treatment of commitment cases as quasi-criminal is not
a new concept. One of the first cases to characterize commitment as a
quasi-criminal proceeding was Taylor v. Barker,93 decided by the Kentucky Court of Appeals in 1898. The court concluded that "as such
inquests generally involve the question of personal liberty, it is a
quasi criminal proceeding, properly within the jurisdiction" of the
94
criminal division.
The quasi-criminal distinction was reaffirmed by the same court
87 Id. at 321, 45 N.W. at 768.

88 82 Iowa 573, 48 N.W. 991 (1891).
89 Id. at 578, 48 N.W. at 992-93.
90 Id. at 577, 48 N.W. at 992. This third classification of an action, as defined by Iowa
Code of 1873, ch. 1, §§ 2505-06, [1873] Iowa Laws 429, as amended, IOWA CODE ANN. §
611.2 (1950), provides:
A civil action is a proceeding in a court of justice in which one party, known
as the plaintiff, demands against another party, known as the defendant, the enforcement or protection of a private right, or the prevention or redress of a
private wrong. It may also be brought for the recovery of a penalty or forfeiture.
Every other proceeding in a civil case is a special action.
91 For a further discussion of the criteria by which courts generally distinguish
criminal actions from those that are civil, see United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317
U.S. 537, 553 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), and Amato v. Porter, 157 F.2d 719, 721
(10th Cir. 1946).
92 One author has defined quasi-criminal actions as "cases civil in form but affecting
the personal liberty of a party." Note, The Indigent's Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 76
YALE L.J. 545, 545 n.2 (1967). In addition to commitment, the author recognized habeas
corpus proceedings, juvenile cases, probation revocation, and deportation proceedings as
further examples of quasi-criminal action. Id.
93 20 Ky. L. Rptr. 582, 47 S.W. 217 (Ct. App. 1898).
94 Id. at 583, 47 S.W. at 217. See also Reade v. Halpin, 193 App. Div. 566, 184 N.Y.S.
438 (1920), wherein the court stated that commitment proceedings may result in more
serious consequences than a criminal prosecution. "It seeks nothing less than the incarceration of the individual proceeded against." Id. at 569, 184 N.Y.S. at 440.
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in Denton v. Commonwealth." There, the court recognized that a
lunacy inquest was "neither wholly civil nor wholly criminal."96 In
its broad holding the court stated that where the possible result of
such an inquest is a deprivation of liberty and property "[t]his deprival should be obtained only by the due processes of law under constitutional guarantees."9 17 The court concluded that the defendant was
entitled to the same constitutional protection afforded the accused in

a criminal prosecution.9"
The state's rationale which serves as justification for committing
an individual should not be the proper basis for determining whether
stricter due process requirements should apply. "The legislative intent
for any involuntary commitment statute, moreover, is likely to be
ambivalent, reflecting varying proportions of punitive, restorative and
preventive purposes."9 9 The more logical approach would be to analyze
the effect of the state's action on the constitutionally protected rights
of the individual. Since commitment deprives a person of the fundamental right to liberty, the state should be required to provide procedural safeguards appropriate to the threatened curtailment of one's
freedom. Application of this principle makes the civil-criminal dichotomy irrelevant.1 °0
95 383 S.W.2d 681 (Ky.
96 Id. at 682.

1964).

97 Id. (emphasis added).
98 Id. Similar reasoning was articulated in Ex parte Chin Loy You, 223 F. 833 (D.
Mass. 1915). The court stated that "[t]o make the defendant's substantial rights in a matter
involving personal liberty depend on whether the proceeding be called 'criminal' or
'civil' seems . . . unsound." Id. at 838.
99 Frankel, Preventive Restraint and Just Compensation: Toward a Sanction Law of
the Future, 78 YALE L.J. 229, 235 (1968).
100 The Supreme Court has recognized this approach in recent years when confronted
with state statutes that would permit, as an alternative to penal incarceration, discretionary
substitution of involuntary commitment for an indefinite term. In Specht v. Patterson,
386 U.S. 605 (1967), petitioner, convicted for taking "indecent liberties," initiated a habeas
corpus proceeding after being deprived of his freedom for an indeterminant period without notice and full hearing pursuant to a Colorado sex offender statute. This form of
punishment had been selected in lieu of a term of imprisonment because the trial court
had found him to be either a threat to the public or an habitual offender and mentally
ill as required by the statute. Id. at 607.
Focusing upon the operation of the sex offender statute, the Court observed that the
impetus for its invocation was not the commission of a crime, but any conviction in a
separate proceeding which could characterize the individual as either dangerous to the
public or an habitual offender. Such a determination would therefore represent a finding
of fact that was absent in the original criminal prosecution. Id. at 608. Application of the
sex offender statute consequently created a new charge for which a different form of
criminal punishment was possibly appropriate. Under these circumstances, the Court maintained that petitioner was entitled to the full range of procedural due process safeguards.
Id. at 610. The Court refused to entertain a civil-criminal distinction approach to this
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CASE LAW RECOGNITION OF A RIGHT To COURT
APPOINTED COUNSEL

The right to counsel as a requirement of due process in commitment proceedings has been expressly recognized in Heryford v.
0 l The United States Court of Appeals for
Parker.1
the Tenth Circuit
held, in applying the Gault rationale, that a juvenile commitant had
a "fundamental right of representation by counsel. '10 2 By writ of
habeas corpus, a mother who had previously had her son committed
initiated proceedings to obtain his release from a state training school
for the feeble-minded and epileptic. She attacked a Wyoming statute
that merely provided that a commitant "may be represented by
counsel" at commitment proceedings. 0 The court held that the statutory procedure was insufficient to discharge the state's duty to provide
situation, stating that the confinement, regardless of its purpose, constituted criminal
punishment. Id. at 608-09.
See also Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) (equal protection violated by state
statute which eased institutionalization standards for the pretrial commitment of incompetent criminal defendants); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 512 (1972) (equal protection requires that proceedings which result in commitment in lieu of sentence reflect those
procedural safeguards that are mandatory under the state commitment statute); Baxstrom
v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
101 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968). Dooling v. Overholser, 243 F.2d 825 (D.C. Cir. 1957),
has been cited by some courts and commentators as being the first case to decide that the
appointment of counsel for the indigent mental patient was a constitutional right. See, e.g.,
United States v. Dickerson, 168 F. Supp. 899, 901 n.2 (D.D.C. 1958); Cohen, supra note 12,
at 437 n.62. However, careful analysis of the decision indicates that the court grounded the
right upon the District of Columbia's statutory requirements rather than on constitutional
grounds. 243 F.2d at 827.
Perhaps the first decision to base its requirement of counsel at any stage of the commitment process on constitutional grounds was People ex rel. Rogers v. Stanley, 17 N.Y.2d
256, 217 N.E.2d 636, 270 N.Y.S.2d 573 (1966). In this case, the New York court of appeals
held that a mental patient had a constitutional right to the appointment of an attorney
in a habeas corpus proceeding brought to establish the petitioner's sanity. While Rogers
applied only to habeas corpus proceedings, the same court, one year later, maintained
that a patient was "entitled to be represented by counsel . . . and should have been represented by counsel during the proceedings which resulted in her commitment." People
ex rel. Woodall v. Bigelow, 20 N.Y.2d 852, 853, 231 N.E.2d 777, 778, 285 N.Y.S.2d 85, 85
(1967).
102 396 F.2d at 395-97. The court stated:
Where .. . the state undertakes to act in parens patriae, it has the inescapable
duty to vouchsafe due process, and this necessarily includes the duty to see that
a subject of an involuntary commitment proceedings [sic] is afforded the opportunity to the guiding hand of legal counsel at every step of the proceedings, unless
effectively waived by one authorized to act in his behalf.
Id. at 396. For an analysis of the application of the Gault doctrine to Heryford, see Comment, Alleged Incompetent Held Entitled to Counsel at Civil Commitment Hearing, 43
N.Y.U.L. REv. 1004 (1968).
103 396 F.2d at 395 (quoting from Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 9-449 (1957)).
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counsel at every stage of the proceedings.10 4 The court relied exclusively on Gault in reiterating the position that parens patriae cannot
excuse the state from its duty to ensure due process regardless of
whether the proceedings are labeled civil or criminal. 0 5 Heryford
recognized that the right to due process applies equally to all persons
faced with the threat of involuntary incarceration, whether that person
be an adult facing criminal punishment, a juvenile facing rehabilitation as a delinquent, or the mental incompetent facing treatment and
training. 06
In In re Collman,10 7 an Oregon court of appeals adopted the
rationale of Heryford and Gault. It found that the state's statutory
commitment procedure which permitted the court's discretionary appointment of counsel was constitutionally impermissible 0s In reversing
the order of commitment the court concluded that since civil commitment results in a loss of liberty for an indefinite period, the
commitant is entitled to the appointment of counsel by way of the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 109
Lessard v. Schmidt" ° is the most far ranging decision to date to
recognize a wide panoply of procedural safeguards for the mentally ill.
Invalidating Wisconsin's civil commitment procedures, a three-judge
federal district court held, as a measure of due process, that an individual facing commitment had a right to counsel, including appointed counsel if indigent."' The Wisconsin civil commitment
statute had no provision providing for a right to counsel. The statute
did provide for the appointment of a guardian ad litem in the court's
discretion, who was required to be an attorney. However, the court
396 F.2d at 396.
Id. The court reasoned:
[Like Gault, and of utmost importance, we have a situation in which the liberty
of an individual is at stake, and we think the reasoning in Gault emphatically
applies. It matters not whether the proceedings be labeled "civil" or "criminal"
or whether the subject matter be mental instability or juvenile delinquency.
'04

105

Id.
106 Id.
107 Ore. App. -, 497 P.2d 1233 (Ct. App. 1972).
108 Id. at -, 497 P.2d at 1236-37. ORE. REv. STAT. § 426.100 (1971) provides in pertinent
part:
(1) At the time of the hearing . . the court shall inform the allegedly mentally ill person that he has the right to legal counsel during the proceedings and
that, at his request . . . the court may postpone the hearing . . . to allow the
allegedly mentally ill person an opportunity to obtain counsel ....
(2) If no request for legal counsel is made, the court may, at its discretion,
appoint legal counsel.
109 - Ore. -App. -, 497 P.2d at 1237.
110 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
111 Id. at 1098.
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recognized that an attorney as guardian "does not view his role as
that of an adversary counsel." 112 The court quoted the conclusion of
a recent study of the Wisconsin civil commitment procedures.
In present practice, it seems clear that in almost all cases where a
guardian is appointed he sees his role not as an advocate for the
prospective patient but as a traditional guardian whose function
is to evaluate for himself what is in the best interests of his clientward and then proceed, almost independent of the will of the
client-ward, to accomplish this. 118
The court, in commanding the observance of the constitutional safeguards of due process, cited the Heryford analysis of Gault which ignored the civil-criminal distinction, and instead looked to the loss of
liberty involved in involuntary incarceration. 114 The court made reference to a New York study which indicated the importance of counsel
to those who had contested commitment. On the basis of the disposition of some 55 commitment cases, the study noted that "'[o]ne might
fairly conclude that intervention by counsel acting as patient's attorney
tremendously increases chances of discharge.' "115 By way of dictum
the court concluded that the appointment of a guardian ad litem could
not satisfy the constitutional requirement of representative counsel. 16
The Lessard court then explored the right to counsel at the various stages of the commitment procedure, a right that plaintiff contended existed at every step of the proceedings. 1 The court recognized
the right "as soon after proceedings are begun as is realistically feasible.""" Thus such a right existed at the preliminary hearing on detention, or at a mental health proceeding brought by complaint.
Moreover, counsel was to be permitted sufficient time in advance of
these proceedings to prepare any initial defenses which might be
available. In addition, counsel was to be granted access to all reports,
psychiatric and otherwise, which would be introduced at the hearing. 119
Since the Wisconsin provisions included a jury trial on demand, the
court recognized the necessity for counsel at an early stage in the
Id. at 1097.
118 Id. at 1099 (quoting from Dix, Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill in Wisconsin:
A Need for Reevaluation, 51 MARQ. L REv. 1, 33 (1967)).
114 349 F. Supp. at 1097-98.
115 Id. at 1099 (quoting from Gupta, New York's Mental Health Information Service:
An Experiment in Due Process, 25 Rtrraas L. Rav. 405, 438 (1971)) (footnote omitted by
the court).
116 349 F. Supp. at 1099.
117 Id.
118 Id.
"19 Id. at 1099-1100.
112
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proceedings since it was clear that an individual facing a civil commitment proceeding may not be able to "competently decide whether
to exercise that right without the aid of counsel."' 12 ° The court refused
to recognize the right to counsel at the psychiatric interview brought
by the state since the presence of a third party might limit the efficacy
of the examination. However, recognizing the inability of the individual to properly exercise what it characterized as "his rights of crossexamination without the presence of counsel at this critical stage in
the proceeding," the court would require that the state make available
to defense counsel recordings and written results of the interview. 12'
The Lessard court recognized that involuntary civil commitment
of those adjudged mentally ill and consequently hospitalized for
lengthy periods "may greatly increase the symptoms of mental illness
and make adjustment to society more difficult."'122 Additionally it
found that an adjudication of mental illness results in the loss of basic
civil liberties as well as future opportunities. Thus, the court equated
the interest of an individual in avoiding civil commitment "at least
as high as those of persons accused of criminal offenses,"' 123 and emphasized the "importance of strict adherence to stringent procedural
requirements and the necessity for narrow, precise standards."' 124 In
addition to defining and extending the right to counsel, the Lessard
court applied a variety of due process safeguards to the commitment
process: notice and opportunity to be heard; proof beyond a reasonable
doubt that an individual is mentally ill and dangerous; proof that less
restrictive alternatives to commitment were investigated and found
neither available nor suitable; the privilege against self-incrimination
including statements made to a psychiatrist; and the exclusion of hear125
say evidence from the commitment hearing.
at 1100.
Id.
122 Id. at 1087.
123 Id. at 1090.
124 Id. at 1088.
125 Id. at 1090-1103.
There have been to date relatively few additional cases expressly finding a constitutional right to court appointed counsel in the commitment process. A recent Ohio decision,
which had extended the right to court appointed counsel to mental patients at the commitment hearing, has been reversed by that state's supreme court on grounds of mootness,
although the latter expressed approval of the lower court's discussion of the right to counsel issue. In re Popp, 33 Ohio App. 2d 22, 292 N.E.2d 330 (1972), rev'd on other grounds,
CCH 1973 Pov. L. RaP.
17,573 (Ohio, July 11, 1973). Cf. Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S.
107 (1966) (New York statute that permitted civil commitment upon expiration of prison
sentence without right to de novo review by jury trial on the question of sanity, held to
be a denial of equal protection since such a procedure was prescribed for the civil com120 Id.
121
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CONCLUSION

The argument for the extension of the right to court appointed
counsel at involuntary civil commitment proceedings is made pointedly
clear by the Lessard decision.
The damage done is not confined to a small number among the
population. In 1963, 679,000 persons were confined in mental institutions in the United States; only 250,000 persons were incarcerated in all prisons administered by the states and federal govern6

ment.12

New Jersey's statutory scheme regulating the civil commitment
process falls far short of the due process standards recognized in Heryford, Colman, and Lessard.127 By way of dicta, New Jersey case law
has recognized that fundamental fairness requires court appointed
counsel for an indigent commitant, both upon application for habeas
corpus as well as at the commitment hearing itself.'28 A recent lower
court decision has held that due process requires the right to an independent psychiatric examination at the expense of the state in order
that the commitment hearing sufficiently safeguard the commitant's
rights. 129 Coll v. Kugler,130 a suit filed in the federal district court for
New Jersey, has brought the state's commitment statutes under broad
constitutional attack in the manner of Lessard.131
mitment of all others alleged to be mentally ill); In re Barnard, 455 F.2d 1370 (D.C. Cir.
1971) (constitutional requirement of appointed counsel at commitment hearing under
District of Columbia's emergency hospitalization procedure); Dixon v. Attorney General,
325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971) (due process requires right to court appointed counsel
at proceedings for recommitment of mentally ill after original authority for confinement
on basis of criminal conviction had expired).
126 349 F. Supp. at 1090 (citing Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 44 TEx. L. REV. 424, 432-33 (1966)).
127 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-23 et seq. (Supp. 1973-74).

128 McCorkle v. Smith, 100 N.J. Super. 595, 602, 242 A.2d 861, 865 (App. Div. 1968).
129 In re Gannon, 123 N.J. Super. 104, 105-06, 301 A.2d 493, 494 (Somerset County Ct.
1973).
180 Civil No. 1525-73 (D.N.J., filed October 23, 1973).
181 Plaintiffs' Complaint at 12, Coll v. Kugler, Civil No. 1525-73 (D.N.J., filed October
23, 1973). New Jersey's statutory scheme is alleged to be unconstitutional on its face and
as applied for failure to require the following:
a. effective, adequate and timely notice of the "charges" under which a person is
sought to be detained;
b. adequate notice of all rights, including appointed counsel if indigent and right
to jury trial;
c. adequate discovery proceedings, confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses;
d. permits detention up to 112 days without a preliminary hearing on probable
cause;
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A growing trend is evident. The courts of this nation have begun
to recognize their responsibility for insuring that due process plays a
part in involuntary civil commitments. Coll presents the judiciary
with the opportunity of recognizing the demise of the "civil" label
which has been affixed to these proceedings, and afford those alleged
to be mentally ill with sufficient procedural safeguards to insure the
protection of their fundamental liberties.
Robert J. Parsons
e. permits detention up to 112 days without a full hearing on the necessity for
commitment;
f. permits indefinite commitment upon a hearing in which the individual is not
represented by adversary counsel;
g. exclusion of hearsay evidence;
h. warning of benefit of privilege against self-incrimination;
i. proof beyond reasonable doubt that such person is mentally ill and as a result
of such illness is dangerous;
j. those seeking commitment to consider less restrictive alternatives to commitment;
k. periodic judicial review.

